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Of the 22 identifiable federal political systems in the world, Canada’s is
probably one of the most unique. For, unlike many other federal systems,
Canada’s is tending to be a rapidly decentralising federal system. Thus, while
much attention has focussed upon the province of Québec and its often
contentious relationship with the federal Government in Canada, sight should not
be lost of the enormity of change which is speedily occurring in Canada’s federal-
provincial relationships.
Much of the change in inter-governmental relations in Canada is yet to
emerge as significant alterations in fiscal inter-actions are taking place and these
threaten to so diversify the existing federal system that in the long-term Canada
may evolve into a much looser federative relationship. That relationship will
evolve in large measure as a consequence of governments at all levels
continuing to seek to "off-load" programmes and programme funding
responsibilities in thier almost obsessive pursuit of fiscal responsibility and deficit
and debt management and reduction.
The federal Government’s announcement regarding alterations in transfer
funding to the provinces contained, initially, in its 1995 federal Budget is likely to
alter significantly not only the quality of life in Canada over the next few decades
but the very essence of the federal system because, in Canada [and, I would
argue that this is characteristic of many other federal political systems], a central-
style government is generally in the business of re-distributing money. With
money comes the commensurate capacity to deliver public goods and services
and with that capacity comes the correlate ability to retain political power which is,
after all, a primary goal of any politician be he or she at a national, provincial or
local government level. Indeed, it can be argued that one of the many contributing
factors in the disintegration of the former Jugoslavian federation was the
incapacity of the national or federal government to re-distribute wealth more
equitably between component units of the federation. Similarly, the division of
Czechoslovakia into two independent states hinged in some measure upon
alleged failures to equally distribute wealth within the federation.
In the case of Canada, re-distribution of wealth within the country has been
an absolute norm of the operational federal system. Historically monies were re-
distributed in consequence of deals done "under a table" or in a  "political back
rooms". Money was moved from the federal government to specific provincial
projects often in return for localized political support. Money, therefore, was a
type of federal "glue" holding together all component units in the political
relationship. This is not an uncommon quality of federal systems (Birch, 1955).
Political power could be retained by judicious dispensation of federal monies to
politically supportive regions.
Almost invariably there will exist a revenue-expenditure imbalance in a
federal political system. Economic, social and geographic conditions are never
uniform within federal polities and issues of economic development and quality of
life will vary widely as do individual capacities of component units to serve their
respective populations. Indeed, even within component units there may exist
significant regional variations. This is especially evident in a country such as
Canada where province size frequently exceeds the geographical size of many
independent countries (for example some provinces even have two time zones,
eg. British Columbia and Ontario).
Yet there has been a realization that policy delivery may be more
successfully undertaken at a regional or provincial level than at a full-fledged
national level. Attitudes in this respect changed markedly after World War II when
the provinces began to complain both about a growing federal intrusiveness and
the lack of consultation over funding priorities. Yet there is another dimension to
the issue. National standards of life quality are a matter of immense concern
within a country in which population mobility has been the norm. In brief, if all
Canadians are to have a reasonably comparable standard of living including
access to public services, how is that assurance to be provided given fiscal
inequalities? The role of the federal Government becomes crucial to assurances
that standards of life and opportunities are generally equivalent for all Canadians.
If the federal Government is seen both as "overseer" and as "fiscal resource re-
distributor" than, presumably, it can claim some right to require standardization of
service quality and delivery. However, it is the provinces which bear immense
constitutional responsibility for legislation in so many policy areas where equality
of standards is at issue. In the late 1970’s for example, in an effort to cushion
some provinces from the economic impact of a world petroleum embargo, the
federal Government launched a National Energy Policy which, among other
things, included creation of a government owned petroleum exploration,
development and distribution corporation (PetroCan -which has since been
privatized) and an assurance that the "gate price" for petroleum and natural gas
products would be essentially the same within provinces without oil and gas
resources as it was within those provinces with such resources1. The issue of a
federal Government obligation to assure equality of opportunity was a key feature
of the National Energy Policy. However, it eventually succumbed to rampant
provincialism in the form of several western provinces hard-line on inter-
governmental relations. The issue of national standards has become even more
important due to the entrenchment of social and economic rights as well as the
right to mobility within Canada in the 1982 constitutional Charter of Rights and
Freedoms.
Historically, federal funds have been transferred to the provinces through
either special grants ("pork-barrelling" as it is termed in some circles -’the buying
of political favour’) or grants-in-aid. Grants-in-aid have been characteristic of the
Canadian federal system since its very inception in 1867. For example, original
fiscal arrangements concluded as part of the Confederation agreement were
weighted in favour of the Atlantic or Maritime provinces2 from the very beginning
(Graham, 1960; Maxwell, 1937; 1948; Perry, 1953; 1956). However, the grants-
in-aid system did not adequately protect some provinces in Canada from the
impact of the global depression in the 1930’s. A Royal Commission on Dominion-
Provincial Relations, which Tabled its Report on May 3, 1940, argued that more
was required than simply grants-in-aid and the Royal Commission (known as the
Rowell-Sirois Commission for its joint Chairs) argued forcefully for an equalization
formula especially in policy areas such as education and social services.
The concept of an equalization formula for fiscal re-distribution was
appealing because of the substantial differences in revenue generating capacities
among provinces and because, especially after World War II, there was a growing
mobility in Canada’s population and people expected relatively equivalent
standards throughout the country. Naturally there will always be debate over the
basis upon which an equalization formula is developed.
But, as the provinces began to "feel their political way" after the highly
centralized wartime period, they began to seek ways to pursue their own
perceptions of political identity. Consequently, a move was made towards more
formal inter-governmental funding formulas. Formulas which finally emerged
included equalization payments based upon a complex calculation of need.
Provinces were allocated funds somewhat related to need3. Other formulas, for
example the Canada Assistance Plan (CAP) and Established Programmes
Financing (EPF) were mutually negotiated and designed largely both to ensure
national standards and opportunity and to provide funding in specific social policy
areas. EPF which came into being in 1971, for example, covered post-secondary
education and hospital care. All of this is now changing as the federal
Government has ‘blended’ CAP and EPF into a new, reduced, funding
arrangement.
In the 1995 federal Government expenditure budget it was announced that
Established Programmes Finance (EPF) and Canada Assistance Plan (CAP)
would be replaced by a block transfer funding scheme to be known as the
Canada Health and Social Transfer (CHST). Further, it was announced that total
entitlements hitherto available to the provinces through EPF and CAP would be
reduced from $30 billion in 1995-1996 over two years to $25.1 billion by 1997-
1998. And finally, that the current allocation which combined EPF and CAP would
be maintained but that the allocation formula would be re-examined for 1997-
1998 and changed, either partially or fully, to per capita entitlements thereafter.
Ironically, a return to capitation as a basis for funding inter-governmental fiscal
transfers is an echo of the original formula in the 1867 constitution. That
capitation formula proved inadequate in the 50 years thereafter -indeed, a most
remarkable mockery of per capita funding may be found in a 1907 Constitutional
Amendment which assured the province of British Columbia that even if its actual
population fell below a specified level its per capita grant would not be diminished
below that base population! Nevertheless, there is a return to a funding formula
which leaves open doubt about the long-term equity which will result. The 1997
expenditure budget, while offering modest concessions to specific federally
supported programmes, did nothing to alter or reverse significant cut-backs in
federal transfers to the provinces4.
Furthermore, there are some very serious questions about the federal
capacity to exert "leverage" upon the provinces to comply either with federally
mandated service quality standards or with standards developed in collaboration
with the provinces. The argument has always been made that negotiated
standards may meet only minimum accepted levels of quality (the inherent
danger of consensus is that it may also be largely meaningless!). And, further,
that a reduced fiscal role for the federal Government means effectively less
capacity to exert compliance pressure.
It is anticipated that the effect of the funding formula changes on the
overall level of services provided by provincial governments, and the specific
effects on the level of health services, educational services and welfare
programmes will be extremely consequential if not detrimental. Moreover, as the
funding reductions and re-formulisation take place "soft" policy areas such as
environmental protection will be victimized. Already the Government of the
province of Ontario has drastically reduced restrictions of land-use development,
waste disposal, mining and resource based activities and even protection of
consumers from unhealthy food products by reduction of processed food
inspection services5.
Despite a clear link between environmental quality and long-term health
and, thus health care costs, there is reason to suppose that a concerned and
ageing electorate will opt for public expenditures on immediate health care needs
in preference to a less immediately perceived health-environmental quality
linkage. That is the option which is being pursued by the current Government of
Ontario as it removes many environmentally related restrictions upon mining and
forestry development. Short-term political accommodation seems to be much
more the prevailing impetus.
Implementation of the CHST and movement towards per capita funding in
1995-1996 will result in a net decrease in the level of social services provided by
governments across Canada. Furthermore, it will place at risk the federal
Government’s ability to enforce and maintain national standards for health,
education, and social assistance. And in the area of environmental protection the
decline in service delivery probably will be very dramatic. Indeed, when this
Report was first undertaken there was great optimism about prospects for the
future of the delivery of environmental protection in Canada. That has changed
somewhat but more will be said on this later.
As an aside, an analysis of the federal Government’s CHST suggests
three critical problems facing Canadian federalism. These problems largely will
dictate the tone of environmental law and protection and the capacities of all
levels of government in Canada to effectively deliver on environmental protection
services over the long-term.
The most obvious problem facing policy makers and administrators in
Canada is that cash is simply running out. For example, even if total provincial
CHST entitlements6 were to be frozen at its 1997-1998 level, CHST cash would
decline and eventually disappear because tax-points [upon which provincial fiscal
transfer ‘entitlements’ are based] are growing at approximately $700 million a
year. The federal Department of Finance estimates that available cash for the
provinces could disappear by approximately 2012-2013.
This issue of capacity to deliver social services including environmental
protection becomes more complicated simply because there is every possibility
that some provinces will run out of cash much sooner than others. The provincial
cash-flow problem will likely emerge because:
1.Some provinces have smaller initial entitlements per capita (a
consequence of the application of a 1995-1996 allocation base rule); Québec, for
example, would have the largest entitlement while Ontario would come close to
the lowest entitlement;
2.Some provinces have tax points [another component of the equalization
funding formula] which are worth relatively more due to greater levels of
industrialization so they actually would have less cash in the long-term; and,
3.In some other provinces tax points are actually growing faster due to
relatively significant alterations in patterns both of population and industrialization.
In practice, however, what all this means is that re-distributed funds
available to provinces will continue to diminish over the next decade. That
diminution will force all provincial governments to much more carefully selected
priorities. Health care has proven to have been the most politically explosive
policy area while environmental protection apparently has not garnered the same
intensity of public support. And, while one may reiterate the potential for direct
long-term linkages between individual health and quality of the environment (eg.
carcinogens) the argument is difficult to make during times of severe budgetary
constraint and governmental role re-definition.
Compounding the ever increasing general short-fall in funding is a second
problem. Some provinces view the new federal allocation CHST formula as
blatantly unfair. This is because the CHST has the same allocation formula as
EPF and CAP. That is, since Ontario received 35% of EPF and CAP payments
(combined) in 1994 it will receive 35% of CHST even though it has 38% of the
population. EPF and CAP have been allocated in a manner which provides
effective differential treatment in resource allocation for various provinces. EPF
had always been provided on a equal per capita basis. CAP was allocated on a
cost-sharing basis but was frozen for the ‘have’ provinces (this is usually termed
"The cap on CAP"). Total provincial entitlement for 1997-98 were announced in
the 1995 Federal Budget as set at a maximum total federal transfer of $25.1
billion Canadian. Effectively this constitutes a form of zero sum game for it means
that if some provinces are to be net beneficiaries from the CHST funding formula
others will be net losers. Fundamental service equity issues are now pre-eminent
within Canadian federal system and these have enormous consequences for the
prospective delivery of environmental services across provincial and international
boundaries. Regional inequality, linguistic conflict and the unique demands from
Québec already strain the federal relationship but the reduction in long-term
federal fiscal transfers to the provinces could prove disastrous if the argument
that ‘fiscal transfers’ constitute a form of ‘federal glue’ have any validity.
If the increasing gap between "need" and "capacity" is to be addressed,
the federal Government will have to face two basic conundrums. First, it must
determine an optimal level for CHST transfers in order to stabilize the long-term
cash value of those CHST transfers. Since tax points grow and vary over time it
should be fairly apparent that the overall level of CHST transfers must grow
commensurately unless it is a federal Government expectation that as provincial
economies are stimulated into growth the federal Government will be able to off-
load proportions of the CHST or to alter -at its discretion- the basis upon which
the CHST is calculated. The federal Government will need to find a formula-level
of entitlements which can grow over time so that the federal Government
continues to remain a player in the social policy arena. This is basically a political
call and will depend both upon stresses within the federation and upon the
volatility of policy issues, eg. health care. During forthcoming federal and
provincial elections. Second, the level of funding that will be adequate in order for
the federal Government to maintain an assurance of pre-defined national
standards in areas within provincial responsibility needs to be determined. The
federal Government will need to assure a basic level of cash funding in order to
induce provinces to adhere to and to maintain national standards in all areas of
public policy. This requires sufficient cash to defend the CHST as equitable while
protecting mobility rights of Canadians within the country. The fiscal impacts on
the provinces will require a new allocation formula that is fair if national standards
pertaining to environmental protection are to be assured. If ‘fairness’ and ‘equity’
cannot be assured than the prospect of harmonization of environmental policies
across Canada probably will diminish.
Ultimately the argument runs something like this: in the old days the
federal Government put up 70% to 80% or 100% of funding for programmes
which it deemed in the national public interest. Provinces were invited -or
‘seduced’ onside by the lure federal money (“any federal money is good money” I
once heard a Deputy Minister in the province of Newfoundland remark!). Because
of its fiscal predominance, the federal Government could exert leverage and
thereby negotiate nationally applicable standards for service delivery, eg.
environmental impact standards. Money bought friends and the federal
Government bought many a political friend with re-distributed tax dollars.
Naturally those political purchases usually rebounded to the benefit of the
incumbent federal political party. Now things are changing dramatically because
as the federal Government reduces its role in funding -40%, 30% or even 0%-
provincial governments increasingly are querying the right of the federal
Government to set and seek to enforce national standards. The battle has been
brutal in the field of health care as one provincial Government (Alberta) in its
pursuit of debt reduction and its promotion of market-driven ethics, has virtually
dismantled the universal health care system.  Indeed, in August 1996 a special
summer session of the Alberta legislature, called for another reason, became a
focal point for criticism of the provincial Government’s piece-meal destruction of
medicare. Five years ago the federal Government used its fiscal clout to keep the
Alberta medicare system in line with national standards. To-day that clout
increasingly is an exercise shadow-boxing although provincial electorates seem
to be having a clear impact upon even the most regressive provincial
governments. The Premier of Alberta, for example, faced with the need to call a
provincial election7, has sought unsuccessfully to obtain something termed a
"Charter of Health Care Rights" in order to assure provincial voters that, despite
appearances, his Government ostensibly is not destroying or undermining the
health care system.
Increasingly, in the aftermath of two failed attempts to reform their
Constitution8, Canadians have tended to return to the style of intergovernmental
process which was, in any case, emerging even prior to negotiation of the 1987
Meech Lake Accord. In other works I have described this process as one, rooted
in classic ‘Executive federalism’, as "bureaucratic federalism"9. Political
Executives make formal decisions. But the processes whereby problem areas are
identified, analysed and reported upon, are essentially responsibilities of career-
based public officials. Bureaucratic federalism is a term employed to depict the
intricate, sub-political, co-ordinating machinery entrusted with the day-to-day
management of public policies which involve intergovernmental issues. Public
officials can exercise daily contact within a broad policy area or, as is more
normally the case, within the host of daily and often routine policy implementation
areas. Thus, while we speak of "environmental policy", in practice "environmental
policy" consists of a myriad of operational units and activities. For example, ‘water
quality’ may involve inter-governmental committees of public servants covering
topics as diverse as acid rain, trans-boundary water pollution, palatable drinking
water, irrigation, meteorology and climatic monitoring, snowfall and watershed
monitoring and so forth. Sub-committees of line departmental officials specializing
in very specific topics is the usual daily fare in inter-governmental relations in
Canada. The term "bureaucratic federalism" seeks to capture the flexibility of that
relationship and does not imply an intergovernmental process mired in red-tape
or bureaucratic inertia.
As attempts to achieve formal constitutional change have faltered,
governments at all levels in Canada have sought solutions which one might
describe as "service-centred federalism" or "service-based federalism". This is
essentially aconstitutional in nature although it may have profound, conventional,
constitutional consequences. Providing service-based results via administrative
interaction and initiative my preclude the necessity for reference to formal, and
often traumatic, constitutional change10. Service-based federalism is inordinately
pragmatic and focussed upon problem solving and delivery of quality public
services. The key to "service-based federalism" is essentially the process of
viewing policy delivery problems and opportunities from a relatively distinct
perspective. Take one policy or policy-component area, no matter how small, and
develop a co-ordinate policy delivery and problem solving regime.
Bureaucratic federalism is a logical component of what is often termed
"Executive federalism"11; thus, if elected Ministers make policy decisions, it is
largely their career public servants who both prepare advice in support of those
decisions and who, eventually, are responsible both for implementation of policy
decisions and for evaluation and recommendations in respect to changes which
may be required.
THE CANADIAN SETTING
Canada’s Constitution was proclaimed on July 1st, 1867. Like most
constitutions of the 19th and early 20th centuries, many issues of contemporary
public policy simply were inconceivable. Especially in North America where a
frontier mentality was pervasive and where presumptions of unlimited resources
prevailed, environmental issues were simply not on either the political, economic
or even social agenda. Abundances of water, land and natural renewable and
non-renewable resources created a context whereby disposal of waste products
was simple and inexpensive. And, when one had thoroughly exploited a resource,
one simply moved to another location and began again. Only in 1941 when an
international arbitration confirmed that a mineral smelting plant in Canada was the
cause of extensive defoliation in the United States did governments in North
America begin to examine the consequences of modern industrial technology
upon the human and natural environment12.
But, determining jurisdiction in respect to responsibility for environmental
issues within the Canadian federal constitution has been both interpretive and
politically pragmatic with heavy stress upon the latter13.
The interpretative constitutional component emerges from those provisions
of the Canada’s constitution [The Constitution Act, 1982 (as amended)] whereby
competencies are assigned. Specifically, Section 91 (federal jurisdiction) and
Section 92 (provincial jurisdiction). In ordinary terms, environmental issues falling
entirely within a province (eg. control over waste tailings lagoons from mines) fall
easily within provincial jurisdiction. However, where the consequences of an
environmental hazard transcend provincial or international boundaries, they fall
within federal jurisdiction. But the issue is not so nearly precisely defined as
constitutional competencies might suggest. For example, a decision by a
provincial Government to dam, or divert water from, a river which may cross a
provincial or international boundary is both a provincial matter and a federal
matter. Given the validity of riparian rights in both common law and international
law, such a decision must involve both levels of government. A case in point may
be found in the province of British Columbia where cyanide (employed in the gold
refining business) leached into the Similkameen River from the now abandoned
Nickel Plate Mine in Hedley, B. C. Downstream a few kilometres from the village
of Hedley the river crosses the border into the United States. Regulation of
sediment ponds fell within provincial jurisdiction but the consequences of leaching
from the ponds fell within federal jurisdiction as the river is a boundary water.
Clearly inter-governmental problem solving machinery is essential for rapid
rectification of accidents and correction of problems.
If one seeks to clearly identify federal and provincial competencies it is not
entirely simple as competencies often result either from judicial interpretation or
from mutual agreement and, in that respect, more recently, mutual agreement to
reduce regulatory overlap. Sometimes this has been a matter of simple
practicalities while at other times recourse to the courts has been necessary. In
Canada, while there is no formal constitutional court (as in Germany) the
Supreme Court of Canada does entertain constitutional questions arising in one
of two ways. First, constitutional issues may emerge in the course of virtually any
proceeding within the judicial system. That is fairly normal and relatively straight
forward. Second, however, Canada has available a rather unique device called
"judicial reference". A constitutional question may be referenced by any
government (federal or provincial) to a court within its jurisdiction for a "judicial
opinion". Such reference opinions, while not legally binding, are undoubtedly
highly influential in terms of defining the rules of constitutional relationships. The
ability to offer judicial opinion on "the rules" of constitutional relationships opens
the way to subsequent political negotiation accommodation in respect to
achievement of formal results (Bzdera, 1993; Brown-John, 1984; 1994a). Some
notable cases in Canada wherein the Supreme Court has offered opinions which
were influential is subsequent political resolution of problems include: Reference
re: Ownership of Off-Shore Mineral Rights [1967] SCR 792; Reference re:
Continental Shelf Off-Shore Newfoundland [1984] 1 SCR 86; Reference re:
Resolution to Amend the Constitution [1981] 1 SCR 75314.
The Supreme Court also has participated significantly in defining
competencies for environmental issues. For example in R. vs Crown Zellerbach
Canada Ltd. [1988] 1 SCR 401, the Court employed the "provincial inability" test
as a means for assigning a role to the federal Government in environmental
protection. This case served as the federal lever for federal Government efforts to
regulate environmental issues across provincial boundaries and even, to some
extent, within provinces where federal Crown lands were involved.
Generally, however, Canadian constitutional competencies can be defined
generally as follows:
Federal Government Legislative Competencies relate to:
-exclusive jurisdiction on federal lands and Native (Indian) peoples’
reserves15;
-the capacity to tax [Section 92(2)] "by any mode or system" and to spend
accordingly;
-exclusive jurisdiction over inter-provincial and international trade and
commerce;
-regulate navigation and shipping on coastal and in-land waters;
-regulate offshore and inland fisheries;
-regulate agriculture a jurisdiction shared concurrently with provincial
governments;
-criminal law including regulation for the protection of human health and
safety;
-regulation of works within a province deemed to be works of national
importance;
-regulation of such matters as inter-provincial oil, natural gas and water
pipelines;
-gathering of data through the national census which data may have a
relationship to environmental issues and concerns;
-treaty powers [the federal Government has an exclusive capacity to “sign”
international treaties and agreements but "ratification" will depend upon legislative
competencies; thus, federal signature of an environmental agreement which
required provincial legislative implementation, would necessitate federal-
provincial agreement in advance of formal ratification;
-general powers defined as falling within the "POGG" provision of the
Constitution [POGG is the general "Peace, Order and Good Government" clause
of the preamble of Section 92 of the Constitution].
Provincial governments legislative competencies relate to:
1.exploration, development, conservation and management of non-
renewable natural resources including forestry resources;
2.development, conservation and management of sites and facilities in the
province for the generation and distribution of electrical power;
3.taxation "by any mode or system" of exploitation of some natural
resources such as minerals, forests and hydro-electric power;
4.taxation by "direct" means of any facility or industry exploiting natural
resources;
5.formal education which could include environmental awareness curricula;
6.all matters of property and civil rights;
7.any local work or public undertaking, eg. sewage disposal and domestic
water supplies;
8.all matters of a local or municipal or private nature such as land use and
property zoning, highway and road construction, drainage systems;
9.agriculture which, again, is a shared or concurrent jurisdiction with the
federal government; and, insofar as it is relevant, immigration matters which is
also a concurrent jurisdiction, eg. protection of life and health.
For the federal Government, however, the move into environmental
protection has been undertaken with some reluctance. As Harrison (1996)
argues, federal involvement has vacillated as public opinion and the activities of
interest groups have focussed upon environmental issues. Through most of the
1970’s and into the mid-1980’s the federal Government actively retreated from
involvement in environmental regulation and monitoring. Yet, in consequence of
diverse mega-development projects by several provinces16, the Supreme Court
decision in the Crown Zellerbach case and fears arising from an array of
environmentally hazardous accidents17 propelled governments throughout
Canada to explore not only immediate solutions but longer-term
intergovernmental mechanisms for preventing environmental disasters and for
cleaning up those which might occur. An assortment of initiatives have been
taken by governments at all levels in Canada and while constitutional
controversies have been prominent in the public mind, in practice significant
headway has been made in terms of delivering public policy in the environmental
field.
But difficulties arise from an ill-defined bifurcation in legislative jurisdiction.
Thus, policy making tends itself to be highly diffused. First, the environmental
policy community tends to be rather diverse. There are well defined and clear
interest groups such as Greenpeace, Ducks Unlimited, Canadian Wildlife
Federation, Audubon Society, and more recently several national and provincial
parks have associated "Friends" Societies which support activities within those
parks. But even when one identifies that diversity of environmental interest
groups there is also a counter-balancing array of powerful economic industry
interest groups ranging from commercial water users to forestry, hunting, mining
and agriculture to say nothing of powerful interest groups such as the Business
Council on National Issue and the Canadian Chamber of Commerce and even
trade unions for whom jobs rather than environment is a dominant consideration.
Yet the policy community and related stakeholders on environmental
issues is uncertain both in terms of identity and in terms of prospective political
consequences. The Government of Ontario’s recent move toward diminishing
requirements for environmental impact analysis and reducing regulation of waste
disposal -including elimination of citizens’ actions group participation in siting of
waste disposal dumps- has not fully filtered down into the public mind. Should
Ontario have another PCB spill-type environmental crisis then the public may
again become more actively aware of environmental threats. And, a further
consideration, of course, has been that strident defence of the environment by
such groups as Greenpeace (now in its 26th year) can, and does, alienate
persons who have a predilection for compromise.
Peripheral policy community stakeholders, that is persons or groups with
"amateur" or general environmental interests (for example, the Butterfly Collectors
Association) are never well placed to become active participants in the policy
process. Local butterfly naturalists, for example, are much more intent in counting
and classifying butterflies than they are in lobbying governments to protect the
natural habitat of some butterfly species. The same could be said of narrowly
defined interest groups in a vast array of environmentally related policy areas.
That there is a direct relationship between quality of butterfly habitat and
environment is an important consideration but it is not one likely to garner much
active support both in consequence of the lack of vast numbers of persons
engaged in butterfly counting and in consequence of such interest groups to
translate their concerns into political action.
Native Canadians have become interested and active in environmental
protection to the extent that many native communities still depend upon traditional
lifestyles such as hunting and fishing. In addition, environmental issues emerge
tangentially for native Canadians when traditional burial sites are disturbed, for
example, by mineral exploration companies18. Petroleum exploration in the
Arctic, for example, always posed the threat of damaging oil spills and the long-
term consequences they would pose for local ecology. The massive oil spill in
Alaska from the ship the Exxon Valdaz vividly drove home the precarious nature
of arctic-type ecology and the damage which even a relatively small oil spill can
cause.
A second problem emerges from the diversity of interests in the
environmental policy community. Because interest groups can focus upon a
particular provincial government, for example, the New Democratic Party
Government in British Columbia is currently engaged in another battle with
Greenpeace [Greenpeace being a natural ally of the NDP, but that
notwithstanding, the battle continues!] over "clear-cut logging", gains in
environmental protection can be made on a province-by-province basis. It is an
interesting phenomena that groups such as Greenpeace can count socialist-
premised political parties such as the NDP as natural allies; yet, when those
simpatico political parties occupy power, the natural ally interest group seems
intent on pressing its cause almost to an extreme degree thereby undermining
that very relationship. AS environmentalists in Ontario have now discovered, if
you embarrass your friends too much they may be thrown out of office and then
be replaced by a much less sympathetic government. Recent political history in
the province of Ontario should suggest that even environmental interest groups
should exercise  some discretion in choice of issues and in intensity with which
issues are pressed.
The diversity of interest groups and some uncertainly over constitutional
jurisdiction means that policy outcomes can be quite varied across the country.
And, the federal Government which had only a somewhat tenuous basis for its
claim to be involved in environmental issues (trans-boundary jurisdiction) does
not have a capacity to impose national standards or to even solve national
environmental problems without the close co-operation of provincial governments.
Thus, despite the decision in the Crown Zellerbach case, the federal Government
still requires active co-operation and collaboration from provincial governments to
achieve relative national environmental protection standards.
A third problem, alluded to earlier, relates to long-term funding. In
budgetary terms "a budget is a translation of policy objectives into monetary
terms". For the environmental area that translation of objectives across the
country is very uneven. Taking the cases of Alberta and Ontario and to a lesser
extent New Brunswick, environmental issues not only have received a lower
priority but, as some governments "re-invent" their roles, environmental issues
take both a less important place at the fiscal resources allocation trough and they
can, and do, become a secondary concern for persons seeking to protect more
widely perceived higher priorities, for example, education and health care. The
latter is a potent public policy issue due to the growing number of older and
retired citizens as a proportion of overall population.
For an older person it takes a major commitment to agree that their
immediate health care needs should be placed behind their grand childrens’
environment quality. Moreover, as the proportion of the population in the retired or
pre-retired category continues to grow there is a commensurate political
consequence. The number of active voters concerned with health care is
increasing while the number of voters concerned with long-term environmental
issues actually may be diminishing. The saliency of the environment as a political
issue may be diminishing partially due to the diminution of numbers of actively
concerned voters.
Finally, there is a simple but vexing problem. We tend to speak about
"environmental issues" as if there was some singularity in approach to the field of
environmental protection. Even a casual overview of the range of interest suggest
a corresponding diversity of issue areas. Water resources, for example, mean
different things to different groups. For bird lovers "water resources" connoted
marshlands to be protected in order to preserve shoreline habitats and wildlife.
The same water resource is viewed by groups interested in hunting -from sports
to native persons- as a major corollary of their sustained recreational or survival
interest. But water resources may also have a different meaning for commercial
fishermen, or a pulp and paper company seeking to dispose of wastes or, a
logging company seeking to move timber. And, the problem takes on other
dimensions for municipal governments faced both with a need for potable drinking
water and a need for sewage disposal. Thus, to address the issue of "water"
insofar as it relates to environment and quality of life, effectively is to address
several distinct dimensions of the same theme.
The inherent incompatibility of perceptions of environmental issues
suggests that, perhaps, unlike any other area of public policy environmental
issues trigger more diverse interests and many more diverse interest of what
might be termed the abstract "public interest". Furthermore, when governments
are profoundly committed to economic development and the related issue of job
creation, the tangible interests associated with employment and an healthy
economy can very easily subsume the more eclectic interests associated with the
abstraction ‘a clean environment’.
Canada’s efforts to develop deliverable environmental policies across such
diverse interests and across multiple jurisdictions [and, I have not even hinted at
the municipal government role in environmental policy beyond a reference to
water supplies and sewage disposal]19 has been a fascinating case study.
GOVERNMENTAL RESPONSES TO ENVIRONMENTAL ISSUES
Environmental issues became matters of public debate and policy decision
making during the late 1960’s. Federal legislation included The Canada Water
Act, The Clean Air Act, the Arctic Waters Pollution Act, The Pest Control Products
Act, The National Inland Waters Act and amendments to The Canada Shipping
and Fisheries Act. In 1975 the federal Government approved The Environmental
Contaminants Act20. Meanwhile, at the provincial level virtually every province
was moving rapidly into legislation for environmental protection and regulation
(Doern, 1977, 1990; Winfield, 1994). But legislation also required
operationalization and, for most governments in Canada, this meant creation of
new, or enhancement of existing, environmental impact or assessment
processes. For example, in December, 1973, the federal Government established
an Environmental Assessment and Review Process (EARP) to be undertaken by
all federal departments and agencies. Unfortunately it was not mandatory and
EARPs were designed to be integrated with existing departmental practices and
policies (Mitchell and Turkheim, 1977; Lang, 1979). The federal Government also
became active internationally (eg. the Stockholm Conference on the Environment
in 1972; the Canada-United States Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement, 1972;
the United Nations Environmental Programme, 1975) and, domestically through
support for specific environmental projects, for example a federal loan to the
province of Ontario in 1971 to deal with Great Lakes pollution problems (Dwivedi,
1974).
Very briefly, the federal Fisheries Act is based upon the federal
Government’s designated constitutional responsibility for sea coasts and inland
fisheries The Act prohibits disposal of dangerous or deleterious substances of
any type. "Deleterious substances are considered to be those which, when added
to water, render it ‘deleterious to fish or to the use by man of fish that frequent
that water’". (Nemetz, et al., 1981). The Act provides for fairly sweeping powers
by which Cabinet [the Governor-General-in-Council or Minister] may regulate
substances which are considered deleterious to fish. Fish spawning grounds are
singled out for particular attention as these are basis for the management of fish
stocks. Logging has been especially problematic for spawning fish as soft wood
logs such as fir, cedar, spruce and pine tend to lose their think bark relatively
easily. The bark sinks to bottom of streams and can entirely cover the essential
river-bed sands where spawning fish deposit eggs. The potential for conflict
between federal regulations under the Fisheries Act and provincial regulation of
logging industries has been realized on several occasions.
The Canada Water Act was intended to permit development, in
collaboration with the provinces, of "water quality management areas". For waters
entirely under federal jurisdiction the federal Government is empowered to act
without provincial participation. The Act was very broadly worded thereby
empowering the federal Government to respond quickly to establish water quality
regimes and to regulate water usage within federal jurisdiction.
The Clean Air Act was also very loosely worded in order, again, to permit
rapid responses to trans-boundary air borne pollutants. The Act also permitted
the federal Government to pursue concerns about trans-boundary acid rain
pollution carried by prevailing winds from industrial regions within the United
States especially those in the Great Lakes basin. The Act empowered the
Minister to formulate ambient air quality objectives as a persuasive device for
inducing Canadian industries to self-regulate. This form of suasion was
reinforced, if required, by broad inspection, information and data collection
powers.
The Arctic Waters Pollution Act had both an environmental purpose and a
political purpose. The Act ostensibly was designed to protect a very fragile
ecology against misuse and abuse by petroleum exploration companies. But the
Act also provided the federal Government with a basis for regulating shipping in
arctic waters. Such shipping included a challenge by the Americans who claimed
that the Northwest Passage (rarely traversed due to immense polar ice fields)
was an international waterway. An attempt to send an experimental mega-tanker
The Manhattan through the Northwest Passage failed thereby eliminating the
passage as a prospective water route for shipment of oil from the north slope of
Alaska to the eastern American seaboard. Americans have since constructed a
trans-Alaska pipeline to Valdaz and oil cargoes now move along the west coast.
The Act, therefore, had a secondary political mission (assertion of territorial
jurisdiction over arctic waters) as well as an environmental purpose. Similarly,
Canada’s extension of environmental protection jurisdiction to 200 nautical miles
was designed to protect Canadian coastlines from uncontrolled trans-shipment of
petroleum products and to force agreement on management of fish stocks.
Coincidently, the assertion of environmental protection jurisdiction also raised
unresolved issues of territorial claims involving both the United States (Alaska
boundary extension, Georges Bank in the Nova Scotia Bay of Fundy region) and
France (the French territory of St. Pierre et Miquelon). More recently, it has
involved a very heated contest with Spain over illegal Spanish fishing and abuse
of fish-stocks off the Grand Banks of Newfoundland21.
The Environmental Contaminants Act was jointly administered by two
federal ministries, Environment Canada and Health and Welfare Canada. The Act
was intended to control development of new products which might pose
environmental hazards (Franson and Lucas, 1977). If, in the opinion of either
Minister, a dangerous or potentially noxious substance was likely to enter the
environment in quantities or concentrations considered dangerous. The Act
authorized a Minister to "require" commercial producers of that substance or class
of substances to notify the federal Government and, if necessary, to conduct tests
to meet requirements set by the Minister or Ministers. Manufacture and import of
industrial dioxins, for example, fell within this Act. Interestingly, the Act provided
that consultation should take place with the provinces and the affected industry in
respect to proposed regulations.
The Pest Control Products Act imposed requirements, emerging from
concerns about the commercial and agricultural use of DDT, for registration of all
pesticides and for the creation of regulations on storage, packaging and labelling.
The Hazardous Products Act may be employed to reinforce dangerous product
sale and use22.
At the provincial level in Canada it is safe to assert that all provinces have
in place fairly comprehensive environmental regulation regimes.
British Columbia, for example, established a Pollution Control Board under
the 1967 B.C. Pollution Control Act. Ontario produced a Water Resources Act in
1970 and an Environmental Protection Act in 1971 (amended several times
thereafter). Alberta and Saskatchewan each developed water and air pollution
control acts during the 1970’s. The Alberta Clean Air Act (1971) established a
Director of Pollution Control to regulate operation and construction of industries
likely to cause air pollution. An Alberta Clean Water Act (1971) was followed by
an Hazardous Chemicals Act (1978).
In Québec, while environmental protection legislation is comprehensive,
judicial recourse also has been employed under provisions of the Québec Civil
Code. Employing a concept somewhat similar to the common law premise about
"common nuisance", the courts have allowed actions against environmental
polluters under a civil law premise known as troubles de voisinage. An enterprise,
regardless of its title to land, is considered responsible for damages to
immediately adjacent areas caused by its activities which exceed, in normal
judgement, usual inconvenience.
Some provinces, for example, New Brunswick, have been faced with
unique environmental problems and these have resulted in unique responses. Ne
Brunswick’s forestry industry has been severely threatened over the years by a
devastating creature known as the "spruce budworm". This threat to the industry
has forced the provincial Government to undertake somewhat drastic responses
including massive aerial sprays. Controversy invariably surrounds such enormous
efforts to control a devastating pest (Thompson, et al., 1979).
But the issues surrounding environmenta l protection increasingly have
become more complex as concern over acid rain mounted and, later, ozone
depletion and the problem of CFCs (stratospheric ozone depletion) and global
warming (carbon dioxide emissions) were identified. Furthermore, growing
concern with resource management took on increased meaning as North
Americans began to fully appreciate the "limits to growth" which were clearly
emerging on the continent. Divided and uncertain jurisdictions, along with growing
public concerns (and, it would follow, political consequences), suggested that
there were both practical and political advantages in both leading in
environmental protection and in promoting sustainable development and growth.
Another factor which was beginning to come into play in Canada was the
changing status and role and, public expectations about that status and role for
native peoples -"First Nations". Eastern James Bay Cree and Western Paigan
Indians of Alberta had both demonstrated grave concerns about the
environmental impacts of large-scale mega-projects. Jurisdiction over the affairs
of native Canadians is a constitutional responsibility of the federal Government
although land settlements may fall within provincial jurisdiction where there is no
existent treaty between native peoples and the Crown (this generally includes
native peoples in British Columbia, for example). Thus, environmental concerns
of native Canadians almost by definition became issues of federal Government
interest irrespective of the provincial jurisdiction within which the natives peoples
resided (Stevens, 1987). And, native peoples’ leaders, with a few exceptions,
have demonstrated a significant regard for the fragility of their respective
environments.
RESPONDING TO ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY ISSUES
Development of Canada’s natural resources both in terms of exploitation
and passive use certainly dates from the 19th Century and earlier23. However, a
study in 1971 (MacNeill) conducted under the auspices of the federal Privy
Council Office concluded that public concerns over environmental issues were
not being adequately assuaged by jurisdictional uncertainty and conflict24. The
arguments for a federal  initiative included concerns about inter-provincial (trans-
boundary) and international (trans-boundary, high seas, territorial waters, Arctic
waters) environmental problems, concerns over trans-polar community issues
(the activities of nuclear submarines in arctic waters25, exploration for oil and
natural gas) and, as noted, emerging concerns of native Canadians all compelled
Canada’s federal and provincial governments to consider practical means for
dealing with environmental issues. Another important consideration was the
simple matter of costs associated with environmental protection and disaster
prevention and clean-up. As American experience demonstrated with the Exon
Valdaz tanker disaster, where clean-up is required as a consequence of an
environmentally consequential accident costs can be astronomical.
Precedents for inter-governmental policy co-ordination in Canada can be
traced back as far as the first meeting of federal and provincial Finance Ministers
held in Québec City in 1907. Certainly irregular meetings of the Prime Minister of
Canada with provincial Premiers can be traced to attempts by Prime Minister
MacKenzie King to cajole the provinces into transferring more provincial
jurisdictions to the federal Government. The 1941 Constitutional amendment
transferring responsibility for Old Age Pensions to the federal Government was a
case in point. Generally, however, the provinces did resist the temptation to
transfer jurisdiction to the federal government and, in the long-run, that has
proven to have been important in terms of defining provincial roles in the federal
system.
However, the ‘true path’ of provincialism in Canada became much more
clearly evident under the Prime Ministership of John Diefenbaker in the early
1960’s. Diefenbaker was the first western Canadian to occupy the Prime
Ministership and brought to the position a different conceptual view of federalism.
His first initiatives included radical re-definition for fiscal relationships between the
federal Government and the provinces.  Concepts such as formula funding
replaced ad hoc federal grants-in-aid funding initiatives. For Diefenbaker the
provinces were significant players in the delivery of public policies although, like
most other national political leaders, he did acknowledge the importance of
national standards and equality of services and opportunities for all Canadians.
At a national "Resources for Tomorrow" Conference in October, 1961,
Prime Minister Diefenbaker proposed creation of a national resource council to
aid in the development, management and renewal of Canada’s natural resources.
Further, he proposed that such a council should have a permanent secretariat to
stimulate research and to provide a central focus for co-ordination of ideas and
policies. At conclusion of the Conference, senior bureaucrats from across Canada
began work on developing Mr. Diefenbaker’s proposals. Eventually this activity
bore fruit with creation in March 1964 of the Canadian Council of Resource
Ministers (CCRM). From the very beginning the basis for decision making was to
be responsible resource Ministers and the process was to be that of consensus
building. As Ministers met only once or twice a year, a co-ordinating committee
and a permanent Secretariat existed to facilitate work.
By 1968 the CCRM had expanded its role to include to include studies on
both environmental and resource issues and, on means for improving inter-
governmental relations. Annual Reports of the CCRM during the late 1960’s and
into the 1970’s suggest an organization defining its role as pro-active in both
policy and institutional terms. Indeed, so extensive was the discussion about the
role of the CCRM that by 1971 the CCRM had been re-defined and re-named as
the Canadian Council of Resource and Environment Ministers (CCREM). The link
between resource management and environment was acknowledged. And, the
political imperativeness of environmental issues certainly became clear after the
election of 1968 when Pierre Trudeau became Prime Minister of Canada
(Dwivedi, 1972-73; Lundqvist, 1974).
Another national Conference in 1973, "Man and Resources", organized by
CCREM, among other things raised two key additional issues. First, there was a
recognition that environmental quality guidelines were essential if the practical
advantages of policy co-ordination were to ensue. Second, it was becoming
abundantly apparent that public concerns about resources and environment were
being translated into demands for greater public participation and consultation26.
Ironically, it was this latter pressure which caused much grief for elected
politicians. The "Man and Resources" Conference itself became a forum for
attacking the failures of provincial governments27. Strangely, the very success of
the CCREM in developing the "Man and Resources" Conference led to basic
questions about the purpose and burgeoning size of the Council’s Secretariat.
Furthermore, environmental issues soon began to take a second seat to energy
issues after 1973. At the federal Government level, for example, the Department
of the Environment was reduced to junior status and suffered major staff and
budget reductions by 1977 (Brown, 1992). Until the early 1980’s, therefore, the
CCREM continued to persist but often at the sufferance of governments pursuing
energy resource development. By 1985 various issues, while still co-ordinated
through CCREM, were being considered separately. Thus in its Annual Report for
1984-1985 the CCREM provided separate accounts on the activities of the
Council, energy Ministers, mines and minerals Ministers, environment Ministers
and wildlife Ministers. Jurisdiction was being splintered not only constitutionally
between governments but even further within governments.
A 1987 national Task Force on the Environment and the Economy
provided renewed impetus for restructuring the processes of intergovernmental
resource management and environmental protection. Release of the Report in
September 1987 eventually led to a re-definition of the role of CCREM. By
October 1988 wildlife and forestry Ministries had detached themselves from the
CCREM and the environment Ministers decided to re-focus the Council, re-
defined its role and re-name is. Thus, by 1989 the Canadian Council of Ministers
of the Environment (CCME) had come into being. Eventually it was
headquartered, on purpose, distantly from Ottawa and more or less at the east-
west geographical centre of Canada, Winnipeg, Manitoba.
Since 1990 a key effort of the CCME has been to lead in developing
processes and machinery for intergovernmental co-ordination of environmental
policies and activities. CCME is a Council of 13 Ministers. Reporting directly to it
is a mirror Council of Deputy Ministers. The Secretariat and a Management
Committee reports to the two senior Councils. Three Committees serve the
Council of Deputy Ministers (and, in practice, the Council of Ministers): Strategic
Planning; Environmental Protection; and, of greatest interest to this project,
something known as “Lead Representatives Committee on Harmonization”
(LRC). It is to the work of this latter Committee that we turn to examine the
current state of policy co-ordination on environmental issues in Canada to-day.
Since its inception the CCME has been actively involved in the promotion
of environmental protection and, more recently in sustainable development.
Through the period 1988-1991 the Council was largely guided by a Report
(adopted in the autumn of 1987) from a national Task Force on the Environment
and the Economy (NTFEE). Spurred by that more comprehensive direction, the
CCME released its own Strategic Overview in 1992. This was intended to guide
the Council over the next five years.
Recommendations in the Report were divided into two implementation
phases. Phase One was described as "laying the foundation" and encouraged all
levels of government to engage in development of round tables on environmental
issues and their relationship to the economy. There was also an expression of the
hope that conservation strategies could be developed. Phase Two was dubbed
the "future agenda" and sought to link environmental and conservation issues
with longer-term sustainable development. This latter Phase was to include more
wide-spread leadership from both governments and industry as well as better
communication and education on sustainable development issues (NTFEE,
1988).
Among other things, the National Task Force Report recommended
creation of federal-provincial "round tables" on the environment and the economy.
There was also a continuation of work on issues identified by the former Council
of Resource and Energy Ministers -such matters as management of toxic and
hazardous wastes and the impact of such waste disposal upon air and water
quality. An Advisory Committee on Environment and Economy was created in
October 1988 to provide feedback on implementation of Task Force
recommendations efforts. This Advisory Committee reported back to the CCME in
October 1989.
The Advisory Committee’s 1989 Report is interesting in many respects
because it did identify jurisdictional problems. For example. in the area of
"conservation strategies" [a theme which emerged in the Bruntland Report] the
Advisory Committee suggested that conservation strategies involved integration
of policies pertaining to resource protection, resource management; resource
development and a positive linkage to maintainable sustainable development.
Conservation strategies should also include broadly-based formal consultative
processes designed to ensure public input to developmental programmes and
prospective policies. In its 1989 Report to the CCME the Advisory Committee
identified a key emerging issue. It stated that (p. 11):
A blunt assessment of the current rate of progress in the development of national,
provincial and territorial conservation strategies raises a strong note of concern;
unless an immediate priority is placed on completing conservation strategies,
fewer than half of Canada’s jurisdictions will have strategies in place by 1992.
The CCME’s contribution to the development of conservation strategies
really began in 1989.
A volume titled: Conservation Strategies: A Compendium of Canadian
Experiences, essentially offered suggestions on what it was anticipated would be
effective conservation strategies. By 1992, however, the impetus to develop
conservation strategies had basically been subsumed under more pressing
considerations.
In the post-Meech Lake Accord collapse a mood of pessimism infused
inter-governmental relations in Canada (Brown-John 1991b). Surveys conducted
among senior provincial public servants revealed an immense sense of failure
with the then emerging inter-governmental consultative processes. The
processes as they were emerging were largely consultative. Within line provincial
departments Deputy Ministers (Permanent Secretaries) found that their
relationships with their federal counterparts were much more productive.
Traditionally, meetings of provincial policy area Ministers or their Deputy Ministers
with federal equivalents had been very much dominated by the latter. Agendas
were set by federal officials often with little or no consultation with provincial
counterparts: "Ottawa announced and the provinces received".
The advent of inter-governmental units largely after 1971, often attached to
the Office of the provincial Premier added a new dimension to inter-governmental
relations. Relationships between provincial line departments and their federal
equivalents became less diffused and more closely integrated into an overall
provincial inter-governmental strategy. Often the relationships, especially where
inter-governmental offices were involved, became confrontational as provincial
governments, particularly those in western Canada and, of course, Québec
sought to alter the basic federal relationship. The process saw full fruition in the
weeks leading up to conclusion of the Meech Lake Constitutional Accord when
inter-governmental officials pre-tested the basic ingredients of a prospective
Accord at a meeting of officials in Ottawa.
The process of inter-governmental consultation, negotiation and even
consensus building tends to characterize inter-governmental relations in Canada.
But, in some respects, it has achieved its most characteristic iteration in the more
formal structure of the Canadian Council of Ministers of the Environment (CCME).
Yet even CCME has proven at times a victim of its political masters.
Thus, while some provinces did move forward with development of
conservation strategies, CCME had lost the impetus in terms of development of a
national conservation strategy. Indeed, in the post-Meech Lake Accord period the
idea that a conservation strategy could serve as a basis for planning national
environmental and sustainable development agreements seems to have faded
from the environmental intergovernmental policy agenda.
Yet not all was in disarray. The NTFEE recommendations that "round
tables" be encouraged found some support. Indeed, as far back as 1988 a
National Round Table on Environment and Economy had been launched. In
many respects this National Round Table opened the door to the later much more
broadly defined environmental policy community. Based upon premises of broad
consultation and consensus building the National Round Table (NRT) served to
identify diverse interests and it acted as a facilitator of consultation and
agreement through consensus building. The NRT functioned through a variety of
task forces and sub-committees. Membership invariably was well-balanced and
included spokespersons for a diverse array of policy community interests.
Sectoral round tables (eg. forestry) have served to focus both conflict and conflict
resolution (NRT, 1993).
The Round Table concept has not been without criticism (Howllet, 1990).
Composition was criticized largely because appointments to the Round Tables
were made by governments thereby opening the way to petty patronage through
Cabinet and Ministry preferences. As well, the close working relationship between
industry and government usually meant that industry representation was
dominant while less prominent interests often were excluded. Furthermore, in
practice the Round Tables began to respond to government initiatives rather than
lead initiatives. Agendas were prepared within Ministries, Ministers would offer
platitudes and concurrence of Round Tables would be taken as tacit approval of
any policy initiative. Indeed, by 1993 British Columbia could announce that it was
winding-down its round table as its mandate had been achieved. Little solid
evidence was ever provided in support of that claim but it was clear that the
British Columbia Round Table was becoming something of an impediment to a
provincial Government desperately seeking to weave its way through a minefield
strewn with powerful forest and processed wood companies and increasingly
more strident environmental interest groups.
The same type of battle raged in the province of Ontario until the current
Conservative provincial Government was elected in 1995. Since that election
environmental regulation and protection is being rapidly dismantled and as
recently as August 1996 the Government of Ontario authorized logging in the last
remaining stands of original white and red pine trees left in the province28. Round
Tables do not serve provincial governments intent on unrestricted economic
development.
The relationship between the NRT and CCME initially was very positive.
However, over time the relationship deteriorated as CCME continued to seek
national accommodation while the Round Tables increasingly came to represent
single, often narrowly defined, provincial interests. There was also the issue of
duplication of activities and the inevitability of conflicts emerging from those
activities. In some cases, the NRT became simply one among many interests
consulted by CCME in its efforts to develop policy direction. For example, in a
1993 Report on liability for contaminated waste disposal sites, the NRT was
essentially peripheralized by CCME (CCME, 1993). Another obvious problem was
that as the Round Tables were products of provincial bureaucracies these same
bureaucracies took great pains to set and to manipulate Agendas. Thus, CCME,
as a prospective national environmental policy facilitator and co-ordinator became
less influential in defining agendas which were increasingly more politicized by
provincial Ministries and their local industry associates. CCME also increasingly
sought to direct its work to specific issues while Round Tables increasingly
became forums for broad, often direction less, discussions. Broad environmental
issue discussions were wonderful for public relations but were valueless for the
development of specific policy issue responses. Essentially, therefore, the focus
of environmental policy initiatives tended towards CCME where senior officials
and responsible Ministers could meet, discuss and decide behind closed doors
and away from the glare of media and the invective of irate environmental interest
groups.
Thus, the re-definition of the CCME’s role after 1988 meant that the
Council was to become more involved in a wider range of environmental and
sustainable development issues. Thus, in March 1990 the Council of Environment
Ministers adopted a Statement on Interjurisdictional Co-operation on
Environmental Matters and at the same time the Council finalized something
known as The National Packaging Protocol. The Protocol outlined a plan for the
reduction of consumer product packaging waste by 50% by the year 2000. In
retrospect the objectives of that Protocol largely seem to have been forgotten
despite significant efforts to encourage re-cycling of glass, paper and plastic
wastes.
Incidently, there is evidence of a trend here which has become somewhat
characteristic of inter-governmental relations in general in Canada. The trend is
the tendency to employ terminology and even characteristic practices from the
field of international law and international relations; thus, "Protocols" of
agreement; "ratification" of agreements; the use of "signature" to an agreement as
"agreement in principle" to be followed by formal participant party "ratification".
The trend to employ the terminology of international law and relations has been
observed in other federal jurisdictions and can be viewed positively as an
acknowledgement of the relative status of component units as "sovereign entities
within the limits defined in formal constitutional assignment of legislative
competencies".
During 1990 and 1991, the federal Government was engaged in the
process of developing something known as "The Green Plan". The "Green Plan"
was a much publicized and promoted federal Government initiative. Indeed, the
federal Minister personally attended many of the very public hearings around the
Canada, Public participation was encouraged, focus groups were involved and, in
principle, inter-action of various groups was supposed to result in new federal
directions in environmental policy. The problems with the "Green Plan" were both
the cosmetic nature of the activity in terms of encouraging high levels of public
expectation about prospective policy outputs and the inevitably characteristic
problem of longevity of focus due to the political life expectancy of the average
federal Minister of the Environment. All too frequently much publicized policy
direction initiatives disappear from the policy agenda when the lead Minister
rotates within Cabinet or leaves Cabinet or when a Government is defeated in an
election.
Further compounding the problem was the simple fact that a well
publicized federal environmental initiative neither paid significant heed to
constitutions jurisdictions nor did it encourage the active public to realistically
consider jurisdictional issues. Thus, in perhaps a normal behavioural manner,
“the active environmental public policy community” was encouraged to believe
that a federal Government initiative could carry over into provincial jurisdictions.
This was at a time when the CCME itself was seeking to actively resolve
jurisdictional problems and to reconcile conflicts over inter-provincial
environmental problems. In addition, CCME was continuously monitoring
environmental issues with a view to providing directions to policy makers (IRPP,
1992).
The monitoring function or "State of the Environment" (SOE) was an area
wherein CCME came to play a prominent role. Long-standing complaints about
the state and condition of Canada’s environment had been made by assorted
environmental interest groups over the years. At a 1993 meeting organized by
CCME participants urged the CCME to develop a national clearing house and/or
data bank containing environmental information (Peat Marwick, 1993). Some
provincial governments had been offering generalized SOEs as far back as the
early 1970s and a more comprehensive SOE was prepared by the federal
Government in 1986. The problem with assorted SOEs and even with a national
SOE is that comparison has political drawbacks. Cross-jurisdictional comparisons
hilight discrepancies. With the ease with which information can be moved via
national media, such comparisons lead to allegations that one jurisdiction may not
be doing as well as another jurisdiction. Of course, in terms of comparative
federalism it has always been argued that such cross-jurisdictional comparisons
also have merit. Thus, provinces can be viewed as "laboratories" for experiments
in new legislative directions. Historically, for example, the province of
Saskatchewan led Canada in development of innovative social legislation.
However, once legislation is in place and apparently successful in one province
there is strong political pressure to "copy-cat" that success into another
jurisdiction. Ironically, the dismantling of Canada’s social welfare system which is
being led by conservative governments in Alberta and Ontario is also very much a
product of cross-jurisdictional comparisons. Thus, the enormous advantage of
federal relationships can work both ways to build and to destroy.
SOEs held the prospect of similar political comparisons and, thus, from the
perspective of CCME cross-jurisdictional comparisons could prove counter-
productive. The prospect of embarrassing provincial governments while
simultaneously seeking to promote co-operation was daunting.
In 1992, in its Strategic Overview (CCME, 1992) the Council sought to
establish specific goals and to prioritize those goals.
Building partnerships;
Building a vision of Sustainable Development and integrating that with
environmental issues;
Overcoming jurisdictional fragmentation, overlap, duplication and conflict;
and,
Adjusting to Canada’s global position and international realities.
Prospective CCME activities pursuant to these goals were prioritized as
‘high’, ‘medium’ and ‘low’. High priorities were assigned to such matters as air
quality, global warming, environmental assessments and impact analysis, and
liability issues emerging from contaminated waste disposal sites. Medium
priorities included waste management and technical advancements in waste
management technology including harmonization of regulation. Finally, lower
priorities included the politically dangerous field of SOE reporting. Particular
issues such as incorporating the views and concerns of native peoples began to
emerged after 1992.
Key areas such as the linkage between an healthy economy and an
healthy environment eventually garnered high priority as the symbiosis of the
mutual relationship became more evident. Furthermore, increased criticism over
jurisdictional disputes between the federal Government and several provinces -
some of which, as noted earlier, required resolution by the Supreme Court of
Canada- more or less forced the CCME to actively engage in cross-jurisdictional
harmonization. For example, even in the area of inter-provincial trade it was not
uncommon for provinces to employ environmental quality standards to restrict the
free movement of commerce among provinces. "Non-tariff" barriers to trade are
common in relationships between states in the United States. But in that federal
jurisdiction, the presence of a constitutional "commerce clause" has facilitated
federal intervention to reduce some artificial barriers to the free flow of goods and
services. But this is not the case in Canada where the relevant provisions of the
constitution have been much more restrictively interpreted.
Consequently, negotiations among provinces over matters seemingly as
innocuous as quality of the environment have been linked, often to surreptitious
provincial broad policy agendas which incorporated a wide range of provincial
jurisdictional claims and bargaining positions. And, such integration as might have
occurred could only transpire at the level of First Ministers’ Conferences which
are held, generally, but once a year and which have crowded agendas covering
all aspects of the management of the federal system from macro-constitutional to
critical issues such as transfer payments and agreements on basic fiscal issues.
Consequently, the capacity of CCME to facilitate co-operation and
consensus building on environmental issues was invariably constrained by
related economic and even constitutional issues which were well outside the
competence and capacity of CCME to control. Indeed, as an aside at this point,
CCME is somewhat politically vulnerable at this point in time because, as
suggested earlier, as governments seek to manage debts and current account
deficits environmental policy issues have been generally assigned a reduced
importance. Evidence in support of this may be found in major operational funding
reductions for CCME’s activities.
Inter-provincial trade negotiations, on occasion, have been rancorous.
Adding to the problem has been a separatist provincial government in Québec
which has employed virtually any pretext, no matter how irrelevant or even
ludicrous, to convince its residents that federalism does not work and that the
solution to all problems is separation from Canada! For example, a federal
Government requirement that Phase II of the massive James Bay hydro-electric
development needed an impact assessment -as most of the land involved is
claimed or administered by native peoples whose fate falls within federal
jurisdiction- was greeted by the Québec Government as another example of the
federal Government trying to thwart Québec’s pursuit of self-interest and
sovereignty29. The argument was absurd but it served to illustrate the complexity
of dealing with environmental issues which are invariably linked with broader
political and economic agendas. Indeed, in a fit of nationalistic pique the Québec
Government even boycotted a critical annual meeting of provincial Premiers
where significant progress was made on reduction of inter-provincial barriers to
free trade, These barriers can range from local government requirements that
goods and services contracts be awarded locally rather than to the lowest
competitive bidder to matters such as varying regulatory standards and
professional qualifications.
The CCME was also peripheralized when the North American Free Trade
Agreement was concluded between Canada, Mexico and the United States.
Responsibility for carrying-out environmental responsibilities under NAFTA was
assigned to trade Ministers. CCME, as a Council of Environment Ministers, was
effectively by-passed thereby suggesting that environmental quality
considerations were to take second or even tertiary place to free trade.
Nevertheless, pressure has remained for some form of integration of policy
making, decision making and policy implementation in the environmental and
sustainable development public policy area. The Bruntland Commission, for
example, had stressed the dangers of fragmented decision making in the
environmental field. The CCME in both  the 1992 and 1993 environmental scan
workshops had concluded that institutional accommodation was required to
manage environmental concerns:
...positive environmental measures introduced by environmental ministries are
being counteracted by forestry, agriculture, energy, economic development, and
finance ministries. In short, ...the environment ministries must reach out to other
ministries just as the other ministries need to involve the environment ministries
(CCME, 1992; 83).
Intra-governmental harmonization was proving as vexing as inter-
governmental harmonization. Even within their own provincial jurisdictions
environmental Ministers, while ostensible occupants of high-profile ministerial
portfolios, were not ‘in the loop’ of high-powered Cabinet Ministers.
The issue of conflicts between governmental ministries, between
governments and between economic development and environmental priorities
dominates the whole field of environmental public policy in Canada. For example,
what constitutes an "environmental impact assessment" is far from normative. A
move, for example, by the province of British Columbia in 1993 to put in place
environmental assessment legislation was dominated by the provincial Minister’s
desire to have his regulations in place before pending federal legislation in order
that his province’s version of environmental assessment would take precedence
should federal and provincial regulations come into conflict (The Globe and Mail,
June 29, 1993, p. B2). This, of course, emphasizes the problem of vagueness in
constitutional de-limitation of jurisdiction. Where federal fisheries regulations
might conflict with provincial regulations relating to waste disposal of pulp plant
effluents, the province sought to protect its economic concerns in preference to
federal responsibilities for off-shore fisheries.
Other examples abound of conflicts in interpretation of what constitutes an
effective environmental impact assessment. For example, a province of Nova
Scotia coal powered generating plant known as the Point Aconi project received a
cursory one-day public hearing despite protests from environmentalists. And, in
Québec, an attempt by the Québec Environmental Hearing Board to conduct an
environmental impact assessment of something known as the SOLIGAZ
development was turned down by the province’s environment Minister (The Globe
and Mail, March 28, 1992, p. B4). The Oldman River dam project in Alberta
received permission to construct a dam in 1986; the comprehensive
environmental assessment was not completed until 1990 and Alberta in
collaboration with five other provinces challenged a federal Government effort to
introduce a federal environmental impact assessment. Meanwhile, construction of
the dam continued. The Supreme Court ordered a federal environmental
assessment but that scarcely delayed construction. Similarly in Saskatchewan a
dispute over environmental assessment during construction of the Rafferty-
Alameda hydro and irrigation dam was sent to the Supreme Court and while a
federal environmental assessment was ordered, construction continued.
Provinces, therefore under the imperative of economic development have
demonstrably placed environmental concerns much lower upon the policy
agenda. It was surprising therefore, that in 1993 the Canadian Council of
Environment Ministers actually concurred in directing their senior staff to prepare
a draft agreement for harmonization of policy delivery in the environmental field.
Perhaps the environment ministers were beginning to appreciate that the public’s
patience with jurisdictional ‘turf wars’ was wearing thin.
THE HARMONIZATION INITIATIVE OF CCME30
Harmonization of environmental management was identified as a major
priority in November, 1993. Intended to reduce duplication and minimize
jurisdictional overlap, the Council of Ministers directed that a committee of senior
federal, provincial and territorial officials [the Lead Representatives Committee
(LRC) develop guidelines to enhance environmental protection in Canada. The
LRC subsequently began work on an Environmental Management Framework
Agreement (EMFA) which contains 11 Schedules. These 11 Schedules are listed
later in this discussion. Each Schedule Title is accompanied by a brief descriptive
note. Each Schedule contains, as an Appendix, a relatively complete list of
applicable provincial and territorial legislation and regulations.
The EMFA is the product of a developing, although often sporadic, history
of seeking co-operation among levels of governments in Canada. In 1990, for
example, CCME developed a Statement of Interjurisdictional Co-operation on
Environmental Matters. This Statement served as a basis for mutual co-operation
in the effort to develop national and even international approaches to
environmental problems. In the period between 1990 and 1995 several co-
operative agreements were reached: The National Contaminated Sites
Remediation Programme; the National Packaging Protocol; The National Action
Plan to Phase Out CFCs; The Canadian Water Quality Guidelines; and, The
National action Plan to Encourage Water Use Efficiency. In addition, acting as co-
ordinator and lead management agency, CCME actively aided in preparing for
Canada’s participation at the United Nations Conference on Environment and
Development (UNCED) in 1992 and CCME is involved in the follow-up,
development of a Canadian Biodiversity Strategy. Indeed, by 1993 an
Environment Canada [the federal department] inventory listed several hundred
agreements encompassing over 80 intergovernmental activities. Yet many
problems remained.
Federal fisheries management legislation often conflicted with provincial
industrial development initiatives (eg. Phase II of the James Bay Hydro electric
project). And, as Fitzsimmons (1995) has noted: "despite these success, federal
and provincial officials became increasingly concerned that they were treating
symptoms of the problem, rather than its causes". Ironically, the burgeoning list of
intergovernmental agreements increasingly reduced opportunities for public
consultation -the process became less transparent as it became more complex
(although CCME is now endeavouring to rectify that problem with Internet
access).
Furthermore, as the 1990’s dawned, governments throughout Canada
began to introduce significant cost reductions in their respective efforts to manage
debts and deficits. Governments and senior public officials all began to examine
means to reduce regulatory overlap and introduce greater efficiencies into
delivery of environmental services and policies. By mid-1993 federal and
provincial Finance Ministers had more or less agreed upon the need to impose
fiscal constraints upon all their respective governments. It followed that
environment Ministers and their senior officials would not be far behind.
Consequently, in August 1993, senior officials proposed to their Ministers a
fundamental re-think of the manner in which responsibilities were assigned for
resolving environmental issues. Conceptually, the proposal sought to minimize
jurisdictional differences while emphasizing capacities and strengths in terms of
delivery of environmental services and managing policies. In light of failure to
amend Canada’s Constitution through the two attempts known respectively as the
Meech Lake Accord and the Charlottetown Accord, it was clear that
rationalization of environmental policy would have to take place despite
constitutional jurisdictional competencies. Responsibilities would flow to that level
of government best able to deliver the service31.
At the Council of Ministers’ meeting in November, 1993, an officials’ Paper
titled: Rationalizing the Environmental Management Framework was presented.
The Paper proposed development of an Environmental Framework Agreement for
Canada for consideration at the next Ministerial meeting in May, 1994. Almost
simultaneously, Canada’s First Ministers [provincial Premiers and federal Prime
Minister]32 were engaged in developing what became known as the Efficiency of
Federation Agreements which were approved by the First Ministers (except
Québec) in July 1994. The emerging CCME Environmental Framework
Agreement was to be an instrumental component of these broader Federation
Agreements.
Meanwhile CCME was developing the projected Environmental
Management Framework Agreement through a process of line officials’ activities,
CCME Secretariat co-ordination, establishment of a National Advisory Group (16
individuals from across Canada) which provided comment upon draft of a Paper
titled: Rationalizing the Management Regime for the Environment: Purpose,
Objectives and Principles which had been prepared by a task group of officials on
the structure of the proposed EMFA. Between August 1994 and May 1995 the
LRC conducted its work through employment of 14 subcommittees and over 125
officials not including hundreds of others across the country who contributed to
the project. A draft Agreement was available in December 1994 and that draft
was submitted to public consultation (over 1,000 persons identified with
environmental groups or having relevant expertise were engaged in the
consultative process). The stakeholders net was cast wide33 and the door was
opened widely for all comments, submissions and suggestions. By May 1995,
well ahead of schedule, the EMFA accompanied by 11 Schedules was ready for
Ministerial review at the Ministers’ Council meeting. Outstanding issues were
returned to the LRC and additional work was undertaken in anticipation of the
Ministers’ next Council meeting in October 1995. The Agreement was not made
public in detail during that period as the federal Government wanted it examined
by an House of Commons Standing Committee. Canada’s then Environment
Minister, Hon. Sheila Copps MP, expressed concern that the overall EMFA
initiative would undermine national standards and, thus, a comprehensive
national perspective (Kennett, 1995). As of this date (September 1996) the EMFA
has not been agreed to by all levels of government in Canada although it was
anticipated that this would take place in some form at the May, 1996, meeting of
the Council of Ministers (Matas, 1996). That, instead, the Ministers chose to opt
for caution in respect to the Harmonization Agreement and to produce instead a
Communiqué  which appears to have effectively slowed the process by diversion.
More will be said on this later.
THE ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT FRAMEWORK AGREEMENT (EMFA)
In principle, the EMFA would effectively achieve, by administrative action,
some of what could not be achieved by formal constitutional amendment in
Canada. In some respects this is in keeping with two well established traditions in
Canadian federalism: I) the trend towards administrative management of the
federal system; and, ii) the tendency to stress the ‘political’ qualities of federalism
over formal juridical and constitutional issues34. This is what may be referred to
as "service centred federalism" or "service based federalism", that is a federal
relationship where the primary objective is serving the public and resolving issues
irrespective of jurisdiction. In most respects the EMFA is a pragmatic approach to
complex and important political and quality of life issues.
The EMFA encompasses 11 functional areas:
1.Monitoring: data gathering, an environmental database, interpretation
and access to data;
2.Environmental Assessment: the process of identifying and evaluating
environmental impacts of projects or activities and the process of public
consultation thereupon;
3.Compliance: the spectrum of tools available to enforce compliance with
environmental legislation;
4.International Affairs: preparation, negotiation, implementation and/ or
amendment of international environmental agreements;
5.Guidelines, Objectives and Standards: environmental quality codes for
environmental management processes;
6.Policy and Legislation: choice of policy instruments and co-operation
inter-jurisdictionally;
7.Environmental Education/Communications: to provide all Canadians with
information on applicable laws, outstanding issues, government policies and
technical procedures;
8.Environmental Emergency Response: pertains to the capacities of
various levels of governments to respond to accidental discharges of pollutants
especially where health hazards are contemplated;
9.Research and Development: data analysis, development and application
of ecological technologies;
10.’State of the Environment Reporting: interpretation of economic, social
and environmental data and the implications thereof including trends in education;
11.Pollution Prevention: development of pollution prevention programmes
including voluntary and educational activities.
Each of the eleven functional areas was defined as a Schedule to the
Agreement. The draft Agreement and 10 of the 11 Schedules were released for
public discussion in October 1995. The Agreement was discussed at the May,
1996, meeting of Environment Ministers and officials were directed to prepare
only a draft umbrella agreement as well as two "sub-agreements on inspections,
standards and environmental assessment" (CCME, 1996a). Initially, in light of
comments and public discussion the Ministers agreed to defer further discussion
until their next meeting in 1997.
According to the CCME over 1,600 copies of the draft Agreement were
circulated to individuals within the policy community. A period of three months
was given for comment in a host of forums including CCME’s "home page" on the
World Wide Web [www.ccme.ca/ccme]. There are also four public E-mail
discussion groups available for review of the Harmonization Agreement. Some 60
written submissions were received along with comments at several workshops.
CCME organized the comments according to source and commonality of
theme, thus:
Business and Industry expressed views about:
I. the importance of achieving clarity, consistency and predictability in
legislation and regulation;
II. the need to recognize and facilitate voluntary environmental protection
initiatives;
III. the need to view industry as a partner in environmental management;
and,
IV. the need for strong federal leadership in specific areas of
environmental protection and regulation.
Strong views emerged from many of the non-governmental environmental
groups including the Canadian Environmental Network and the Canadian Institute
for Environmental Law and Policy which submitted an 89 page analysis and
commentary.
Environmental Non-Governmental Organizations expressed views about:
I. the possibility that the proposed harmonization Agreement seeks to
solve a problem which does not exist, in other words, there is at issue a
fundamental question about the rationale behind the proposed Agreement;
II. the probable devolution of federal Government environmental roles and
responsibilities35;
III. the prospect of a "new level" of government which is viewed as
illegitimate, unaccountable and unworkable;
IV. the absence of direct involvement for native peoples and their role in
the management of the environment in Canada; and,
V. the responsive nature of the proposed Agreement, that is, it contains
little in the way of an address the real emerging environmental problems and
protection requirements.
Aboriginal or Native Peoples expressed views about:
I. the lack of a specific relationship between environmental concerns and
outstanding land claim agreements and self-government agreements;
II. the lack of specificity in respect to northern territories; and,
III. accommodation of the new northern territory of Nunavut.
Academics, Experts and Other Persons expressed views about:
I. jurisdictional overlap and the role of the federal Government in ensuring
applicability of national minimum standards; and,
II. the lack of attention to the concerns of municipal governments and their
limited fiscal resources.
Other concerns about the proposed Harmonization Agreement related to
such matters as citizen participation ("process transparency"), the boycott of
national forums by the separatist Government of Québec; the lack of clearly
enunciated dispute resolutions processes; and, almost predictably, the simple fact
that such consensus agreements often achieve only the lowest common
denominator of consensus and that results, effectively, in a very mellow mask
behind which provinces can do -as they are doing- more or less as they choose.
The Council of Ministers met in Toronto in late May 1996. In the meeting
Communiqué they expressed the view that henceforth CCME would have a "more
focused vision". "Ministers agreed that emphasis will continue to be placed on
cooperation and coordination between member jurisdictions, particularly relating
to consistent standards and guidelines, policy development, processes and
strategies, and data management".
Officials were directed to prepare an accord for the next meeting "which
would include objectives and principles for effective environmental management".
And, the Ministers "also agreed to develop multilateral agreements on inspection,
environmental assessment and standards development to demonstrate how the
principles of the accord will be applied". Efforts will be made to ensure
harmonization of respective environmental instruments such as legislation and
regulations.
The Ministers did approve a "pollution prevention strategy" especially
insofar as concerns toxic substances. The strategy would involve re-cycling,
appropriate cost-accounting methodologies, partnerships and a commitment to
"strong government leadership". Included in this general area is something
termed "packaging stewardship" which essentially is an euphemism for transfer of
responsibility for regulation and re-cycling of packaging materials over to the
affected industries. Termed "extended responsibilities" the ministers appear to
have more or less abandoned responsibility for regulating the packaging
materials and its disposal or re-cycling.
The Communiqué also contained a very bland statement on environment,
health and occupational safety. The Ministers endorsed "more active partnerships
in these areas". This statement probably reflects the direction in which the Ontario
Government, for example, was heading at the time the Council met. That
province’s minister of the Environment was Chair and in the weeks after the
Council meeting the Government of Ontario both reduced occupational health
protection regulation, eliminated funding for occupational health diagnostic clinics,
and then Tabled legislation (some of which has been withdrawn) which would
have permitted individual employers to negotiate health and safety standards on
an individual factory or plant basis, that is, as part of a collective agreement
where agreements existed or simply as part of a job retention agreement.
Finally, the Ministers expressed concerns about climatic change and
progress being made towards a cleaner environment through cleaner vehicle fuel
emission standards.
In practice, the EMFA could have a profound impact upon both the quality
of life in Canada and upon the very operation of the federal political system.
Whether, in light of the Communiqué of May 31st 1996 this will actually come to
fruition is another ver moot question. Some concerns have been expressed about
the stress upon consensus building within the EMFA -the fear being that
consensus often can be an euphemism for ‘lowest common level’. Nevertheless,
the EMFA could result in a practical transfer of many operational federal functions
to the level of the provinces. Concerns have been expressed, however, about this
form of decentralization partially because it relates more to transferring
responsibility for fiscal arrangements and partially because it is seen by many
observers as part of the long-term process of dismantling and undermining
Canada’s world class social welfare net, Environmental protection is very much
part of the quality of life and dismantling the social welfare net also translates into
an attack upon environmental protection. The Government of Ontario already has
demonstrated a callous disregard for environmental issues as it pushes its
version of “market-driven” government into the Canadian political system.
A strong and active CCME should ensure that, at minimum, continuity in
collaborative and co-operative actions among the provinces will ensue. Kennett
(1995) has suggested that the EMFA -also referred to as the "Harmonization
Initiative"- is federalism by administrative means. This is an argument I have been
making for some years (Brown-John, 1991a, 1991b, 1992a, 1992b). Ultimately,
whether CCME will be permitted to make such innovative inroads into
environmental protection is disturbingly uncertain since May 31, 1996.
Since the May, 1996 meeting, Environment Deputy Ministers and their
technical officials have been actively at work following the directions set forth by
the Ministers. By late August and early September, 1996, a Draft "National
Accord on Environmental Harmonization" had been developed. The Draft Accord
offers a Vision of governments working in partnership to achieve "the highest
level of environmental quality for all Canadians". The Vision is the sort of political
vision one would expect after all to suggest anything but "the highest quality"
would be politically meaningless.
An essential component of the Draft National Accord on Environmental
Harmonization is a statement of Objectives. Under three statements of principle
six objectives are enumerated, viz:
The objectives of harmonization are to:
-enhance environmental protection;
-promote sustainable development; and
-achieve greater efficiency, effectiveness, accountability, predictability and
clarity [my emphasis] in Canada, by:
1.Reviewing and adjusting Canada’s environmental management regime
to accommodate environmental needs, capacities, expertise and fiscal realities;
Comment: the linkage between ‘needs’ and ‘fiscal realities’ suggests, in
light of fiscal issues discussed earlier, the prospect that needs will be defined as
minimal or, at best, needs will be defined in terms of limited fiscal capabilities; the
reference to ‘expertise’ suggests a sharing of data and expert research and
technical knowledge -this is an area already a practical reality in some other
public policy areas within Canada where provincial governments often share
rather than duplicate research and findings.
2.Delineating the respective roles and responsibilities of the Federal,
Provincial and Territorial governments within an environmental management
partnership;
Comment: Of course this is one of the primary reasons for the
harmonization initiative; Canadians are proving less and less tolerant of claims
that constitutional jurisdiction bars a level of government from providing a specific
service; constitutional jurisdiction surely will be respected, but a move towards a
more service-centred federal relationship will offer the prospect of less conflict
and duplication and more efficiency in ensuring delivery of services conducive to
environmental protection.
3.Developing and implementing nationally consistent environmental
measures in Canada, including policies, standards, objectives, legislation and
regulations, using a co-operative approach;
Comment: In some respects this is the proverbial bottom-line because if
Canada’s environmental policy establishment is unable to assure residents,
regardless of jurisdiction, that they will not be disadvantaged or the quality of their
lives impaired, then the Ministers and CCME will have failed; if provinces were
unrestrained in establishing environmental standards, then two possibilities would
seem to result, I) trans-boundary pollution would be economically viable, eg. To
export problems to another jurisdiction; and, ii) competition could ensue-much as
it once did in respect to varying rates of taxation and as it still does in terms of
inducements to locate industries -easing environmental legislation as an
inducement for industry to locate in weak environmental regulation areas is
already a problem in the North American Free Trade Agreement and in the
Canada-US Free Trade Agreement where, in the former, Mexican environmental
legislation is weak and, in respect to the latter, many southern American states
have inconsequential environmental and labour legislation.
4.Identifying and addressing gaps and weaknesses in environmental
activities;
Comment One is tempted to ask the question here, if CCME for example
identifies a “gap” or “weakness” will the Ministers have the collective will to
‘require’ alterations in the practices of one of their collective jurisdictions?
5.Preventing inter-jurisdictional disputes; and
Comment: Once more this is a key feature of the harmonization process;
inter-jurisdiction disputes occur both due to constitutional bifurcation and, due to
economic and social policy goals variations; resolving inter-jurisdictional disputes
in Canada has enormous political ramifications and it will be interesting to see
whether Canada’s environment Ministers have the will to engage in dispute
resolution in a sometimes highly charged political context.
6.Ensuring all Canadians can be confident that the quality of their
environment is respected by neighbouring jurisdictions.
Comment: Whether this will encompass international issues as well as
inter-provincial is not entirely clear; what is clear, however, is that if international
is included in “neighbouring” then the peripheralization of CCME in the North
American Free Trade negotiations and subsequent Agreement does not
necessarily augur well for resolving very complex trans-boundary and shared
resources (eg. The Great Lakes) issues with the United States.
Federalism is essentially the management of conflict and political decision
making. The Draft National Accord, along with the two tentative Sub-Agreements
(CCME, 1996d; 1996e) could be significant steps (albeit, NOT ‘great leaps for
humankind’!) forward not only in terms of managing complex public policy issue
areas but in terms of managing a complex political system. Canadians, again, are
demonstrating to the world that while federal political systems may have their
stresses and strains, they can be made to function and to achieve the primary
purposes of any governmental system -serving the public.
CCME (1996c) have advised Canadians that it is the intention of all senior
levels of government in Canada "to prepare a new multilateral approach to
harmonization of Environmental Assessment" and, further, to "undertake to
modify their respective legislation, regulations, guidelines and processes to reflect
the new [multilateral] approach". Streamlining processes, reducing costs,
satisfying demands for environmental assessments, recognition of aboriginal
environmental issues, meeting international standards and facilitating
development of an environmental assessment industry, are all lofty goals.
Whether the political will and fiscal resources will be there when the public need
is evident is quite another matter. At the moment the political will appears to be
lacking as provincial governments, ostensibly in the interests of deficit reduction,
slash environmental protection and monitoring budgets.
Trendy to-day, in the more neo-conservative "market economy" is
disengagement of government, deregulation and the introduction of often
questionable voluntary industry standards and guidelines. Industry capture of the
environmental protection responsibility, combined with industry sponsored
environmental audits, places both environmental protection and inter-
governmental co-operation of universal standards in serious jeopardy. The
province of Alberta, for example, privatized publication of its Guidelines on
Hunting and Fishing in the province. The private producer of the Guidelines then
solicited commercial advertising for the publication. A very prominent advertiser
was a notorious convicted poacher and dealer in animal body parts. Voluntary
industry standards, which have worked to effectively exclude serious
environmental concerns have made a mockery of the CCME’s Harmonization
Initiative.
One cannot help being somewhat sceptical of prospective Ministerial
Harmonization Accord when the Ministers themselves have been much less than
absolutely forthright in pursuing even the motherhood objective of "the highest
level of environmental quality for all Canadians". If Ministers have spent so much
time, and consumed so much of the effort of their technical officials, and they
have not yet achieved a broadly based environmental harmonization consensus
to this point, can Canadians realistically expect much improvement in future?
Federalism can be made to work when there is a broad understanding of
the purposes of various levels of government. That consensus on purpose -the
"will to succeed"- must exist or much of what will purport to be an harmonization
of jurisdiction and process will be meaningless in practice.
NOTES
Persons interested in commenting or learning more of the CCME Harmonization Initiative are invited to log-on
to the CCME Internet Home Page or participate in any one of four discussion group via e-mail. The Internet
address is: www.ccme.ca/ccme.
1. Alberta, by far, has the largest oil and natural gas reserves in Canada. It is followed by Saskatchewan,
British Columbia, Manitoba and Ontario. The National Energy Policy sought to develop alternate reserves on
federal Crown lands in the Arctic and to assist the provinces of Newfoundland and Nova Scotia with off-shore
developments. These latter have proven costly and in large measure have been put on hold as the global per
barrel price of oil has fallen thereby making exploitation of off-shore reserves less attractive. Montréal, in the
province of Québec, has always had a large petroleum refining industry using Trinidadian and Venezuelan
crude oil.
2. A note of clarification. “Atlantic provinces” refers to all four Canadian provinces more or less surrounded by
the Atlantic ocean: Nova Scotia; New Brunswick; Prince Edward Island; and Newfoundland. The term
“Maritime provinces” generally does not include Newfoundland which joined Canada’s federation in 1949.
And, as if to add to the distinctiveness of Newfoundland, it is one-half time zone earlier than the other three
Maritime provinces -life is always “one-half hour earlier in Newfoundland”.
3. The problem of funding is closely linked to revenue generation or, most specifically, taxation which is by far
the largest source of revenue for all governments. As the federal Government has a much greater capacity to
tax -“by any mode or system”- it is commensurately more able to generate revenue and, thereby, to dominate
the taxation field. However, the provinces bear the preponderance of responsibilities for delivery social and
educational services (Sections 92 & 93). There is, as a result, a continuous imbalance between revenue
capacity and legislative competency. In one area, natural resources, this was partially rectified in a 1982
constitutional amendment (Section 92A) which permitted the provinces to raise revenues by taxation of
mining, hydro-electric and forestry industries “by any mode or system” of taxation -the wording formula
available to the federal Government in Section 91(2).
4. Ontario, for example, has seen federal funding for MEDICARE shrink from 52¢ of every dollar spent in
1980 to 32¢ for every dollar spent in 1995. This has resulted in a significant degree of re-structuring of health
care services including hospital closures. Many argue that thehe quality of Canada’s universal and equitable
health care system is in jeopardy. See Maclean’s, “Frustration in Ottawa”. December 2, 1996, p. 62-64.
5. The pressure to reduce environmental regulation is almost unceasing. On September 16, 1996, the
Canadian Broadcasting Corporation carried a national news story to the effect that mining companies were
launching a concerted effort to reduce the amount of government regulation which they allege is deterring
them from mining development. The issue arose in connection with development of a diamond mine in
Canada’s Northwest Territories and the delays the development company experienced as native peoples’ land
and environmental issues were resolved. Environmental protection is being diminished in Canada under the
pretext of “deregulation” and the neo-conservative assumption that “deregulation” will translate into a more
competitive market system and, in turn, that will generate new employment. So far, in Ontario at least, despite
deregulation unemployment rates continue to climb.
6. The word “entitlements” has crept into the lexicon of inter-governmental fiscal relations in Canada. It is a
term borrowed from the field of inter-governmental relations in the United States. In that country the
relationship of the federal Government to the States is somewhat more characteristic of a “State-dependency”.
Thus, the word “entitlements” carries with it connotations akin to ‘charitable hand-out’. Employment of the term
in the Canadian context as a means for describing sums transferable to the provinces from the federal
Government seems somewhat inappropriate as, I would argue, Canada’s provinces have a considerably more
influential role in both the tax system and in the negotiation of inter-governmental agreements than do their
American State counterparts. An annual meeting of Canada’s provincial Premiers is a significant political
event [see comments in an editorial in The Vancouver Sun, August 22, 1996 on the power of provincial
Premiers] whereas an annual meeting of US State Governors is largely a non-event.
7. An Alberta provincial election was held March 11, 1997. It saw the Conservatives swept back into office.
8. The “Meech Lake Accord” (1987) and the “Charlottetown Accord” (1992). On the former see Cohen,
(1990); Brown-John, (1989) and on the latter Brown-John, (1992b, 1994).
9. “Bureaucratic federalism”, the ongoing, or daily, processes whereby federal political systems are managed
by career public servants. This would include an elaborate structure of senior and middle management
bureaucrats serving, as part of their normal daily employment, to manage policy delivery in a federal political
system. See Brown-John, (1991a, 1991b. 1991c).
10. Administrative decentralization is a relatively recent phenomena in Canada hence my suggestion that
Canada is moving towards a decentralized federal system. Indeed, one might argue that such decentralization
offers the prospect of Canada becoming a model for complex federating (e.g. Spain) or federal states (e.g.
Belgium). For more on decentralized administration see Cameron (1994).
11. One of the most astute commentators on Canadian federalism was the late Donald V. Smiley. He is
generally credited with coining the term “executive federalism” in the Canadian context [Smiley, 1980 at 52-53
& 91-119]. Smiley described executive federalism as follows:
“The [Canadian] constitution has permitted and in some cases facilitated new balances to be struck in federal
and provincial powers as the relative vigor and effectiveness of the two orders of governments shifted and as
the importance of the responsibilities assigned to them by the constitution changed. In this ongoing process
explicit constitutional amendments and new delineations of federal and provincial powers through judicial
review have been less important than the interactions among governments which I shall designate...as
‘executive federalism’”.
Smiley constantly stresses the importance of “constitutional flexibility” as a pre-requisite to operational
executive federalism.
12. The Trail Smelter Arbitration (Canada-United States) (1938, 1941), Reports of International Arbitration
Awards, iii, 1905.
13. The debate over environmental legislation in the Australian federal system has raised the issue of
pragmatism and politics as key features in the emerging federal-state relationship in that country. Pragmatic
political solutions to public problems seems to be a quality of flexible federal systems. One could argue that
those systems are also most adaptable and, perhaps, most likely to persist. See Barrie (1992); Fowler (1993)
(1994); Commonwealth (1992).
14. For comment upon some of these constitutional references I recommend Russell (1982).
15. On August 21, 1996, for example the Supreme Court of Canada rendered decisions on three cases
involving exploitation of natural resources by native peoples. The cases centred upon claims by native
peoples that they could sell fish caught for purposes other than their own personal use. Native exploitation of
fisheries is restricted to those which were central to the lives of specific native communities prior to arrival of
European settlers. The Vancouver Sun, August 22, 1996, p. 1. Unlike the decision of the Australian Supreme
Court in the Mabo Case the Supreme Court found that only limited rights prevailed from the period prior to
arrival of Europeans. In the Mabo Case the Australian Court ruled that a system of governance was in place at
the time Europeans arrived and that claims that aboriginal lands were terra incognitas were not valid. Thus
rights had been extinguished by colonization; the Canadian court appears not to have followed that line of
reasoning in defining native rights.
16. For example, the province of Québec’s enormous Phase I of the James Bay hydro-electric project; the
Alberta Government’s Oldman River project which was opposed by several native peoples’ groups; and, the
Saskatchewan Government’s Rafferty-Almeda dam project which involves a  Canada-United States boundary
river.
17. The wreck of a flag of convenience registered oil tanker, The Arrow, in Nova Scotia in 1970; a fire
involving toxic PCBs at St. Basile-le Grande, Québec and a transport truck leakage of PCBs along an Ontario
highway, all contributed immensely to public concern about environmental protection and disposal of
hazardous and toxic wastes. Furthermore, a fire in a river in Cleveland, Ohio, USA emphasized the fragility of
the Great Lakes eco-system and led to vigorous activities to protect that special environment.
18. This issue of protection of traditional burial sites has emerged in the West James Bay region of South
Hudson Bay, Ontario, where diamond exploration companies have damaged burial sites during the process of
staking mineral claims. Environmental issues are of immense concern to native Canadians not only because
they pertain to traditional activities but also because so many native communities -many of which are
artificially devised as many peoples did not live in large urban style communities- have major problems with
waste disposal and water supplies.
19. Municipal governments in Canada are creatures of provincial governments. They have no entrenched
constitutional status and their terms of competence are defined by provincial statute.
20. For the most part, while the existing two territories (Yukon and Northwest Territories) are internally self-
governing, federal legislation is applicable. However, many intergovernmental bodies in Canada include
participants from the two territories often as full participants and on other occasions as active observers. As
the territories (a third territory will soon be in existence as the Northwest Territories is divided in two and the
eastern region becomes Nunavat] increasingly take control over their own governance environmental issues
will require full consultation and co-ordination among 14 Canadian governments [10 provinces; 3 territories;
one federal].
21. Spain, of course, has claimed that Canada violated its right to exploit the high seas. Indeed, Spain even
managed to involve some of its partners in the European Community. However, when it became clear to some
EC members that other Members (notably Ireland and Britain) agreed with Canada and they too were angry
with Spain over its continued abuse of North Atlantic fish stocks, Spain was forced to seek a fishing quota
compromise. Spain also has had problems with Morocco and Namibia over the same issue. A Spanish fishing
vessel was arrested by Canadian authorities and Canada did take the issue of Spain’s abuse of natural
resources to the United Nations.
22. During the late 1960’s Canada and the provinces began compilation of a land-use inventory (McCormack,
1971).
23. Resource exploitation really began long before European settlement on the continent as Atlantic fisheries
were a major attraction in the 15th Century. Wildlife and timber resources followed as Europeans sought
animal furs and timber for ship construction. Thereafter, mineral and agricultural resources were pursued
during the 19th Century. It was during the latter part of that Century that governments responded to public
concerns about resource management with establishment of natural wildlife and forest preserves. The first
national park in Canada was established in Banff in 1885. The province of Ontario established Algonquin
provincial park in 1892. And, concerns over management of the Great Lakes as a trans-boundary resource
came to the fore in 1909 with creation of the International Joint Commission.
24. The 1969 federal Liberal Government Speech From The Throne contained a pledge by the new
Government to take an active stand on environmental issues. Public Opinion polls in the preceding year gave
impetus to this pledge as Canadian public opinion overwhelmingly supported environmental protection.
25. American and Soviet nuclear submarines made numerous underwater trips through Canadian arctic
territorial waters. On most occasions, for their respective security reasons these trips were rarely made known
to Canadian authorities. Furthermore, the United States refused to concede that the Northwest Passage,
traversed only rarely by ships, was entirely within Canadian territorial waters. An unsuccessful attempt was
made to force the high seas issue when the United States sent an ballast laden tanker, The Manhattan, into
the Northwest Passage. When the ship became trapped in polar ice it required rescue by the Canadian Coast
Guard. The United States has not abandoned its claim to international status for the waters but Canada, by
extending its territorial jurisdiction for protection of the environment essentially has precluded any further
United States attempts to force the issue. It is often somewhat surprising to many overseas observers that
Canada and the United States still have unresolved boundary disputes.
26. Several provincial governments had taken steps to ensure that environmental issues were both visible and
involved public input. Provincial Ministries of the Environment were either added to existing line departments
or created de nouveau. While regulatory environmental assessment agencies were being established both to
force compliance with the growing body of environmental protection legislation and to provide avenues for
public input into resource developments which might impair or threaten environmental quality.  For
background on some early provincial resource and environmental agencies see Brown-John (1981).
27. The Toronto Globe and Mail recorded that such an attack upon a provincial Government took place at
such a Conference. The Government of Manitoba was attacked for its failure to take into account the social
and ecological costs associated with hydro-electric development on the Churchill River in northern Manitoba.
28. Actual cutting of the 200 year old pine trees began in mid-September, 1996. Logging companies argued
that it was healthy for old trees to be removed so that new, more vigorous, trees could thrive.
Environmentalists attacked the logging operation as an assault upon the heritage of the people of Ontario.
Logging companies carried the day and environmentalists sucumbed to the “creation of jobs” argument.
29. There is an interesting point to be noted here and that is that there is absolutely no basis in international
law for the separatist assumption that pursuit of self-determination (even if it were a critical issue) necessarily
leads to sovereign independence. No relevant United Nations Security Council or General Assembly
Resolution absolutely links self-determination to a right to declare independence. Furthermore, decisions of
the International Court of Justice seem to support the view that unilateral declarations of independence can
flow only when constitutional barriers exist to the expression of the full panapoly of rights and cultural self-
determination.
30. For the moment, material for this section is drawn from Fitzsimmons (1995); Kennett (1995) and Matas
(1996).
31. Conceptually, this is somewhat akin to the controversial European Community “subsidiarity” concept
entrenched in Section 3(b) of the 1992 Maastricht Treaty. Fowler, in his country study on Australia in this
volume notes that in Australia the 1992 Inter-Governmental Agreement on the Environment “was deliberately
designed to reflect the ‘subsidiarity principle’, a concept formulated in the European Community”. In practice
the concept of subsidiarity emerged from a late 19th Century Papal Encyclical; see Toth (1992).
32. In 9 of 10 provinces the First Minister bears the title: Premier; in Québec, however, the Premier is known
as the “Premier Minister”. The change apparently was designed to enhance the status of Québec’s
government; in practice, all it has done is add confusion! Québec’s neo-nationalists indulge in the fantasy of
words of aggrandizement, the provincial capital city “Québec City” becomes “the national capital” while “the
province of Québec” becomes “l’état Québec”.
33. Whether all “Stakeholders” effectively included those who would be considered part of the environmental
policy community is another issue and one not entirely easy to resolve. For example, is it the obligation of
CCME to search out and find all possible groups which have an environmental policy interest? Or, is the onus
for such a search a responsibility of the groups and interests within the policy community? Personally, I am
inclined towards the latter view so long as CCME or like organizations are open and transparent in process
and create no abnormal or unusual barriers to access to information, surely the obligation to “be informed”
rests with those in the policy community.
34. I have addressed this latter issue elsewhere but to reiterate, the argument is as follows. Canadian
federalism is delightfully political. Thus, while decisions of the Supreme Court are taken most seriously -
Canada does employ References to the Court for non-binding opinions- and, while efforts to reform the
Constitution have been attempted, not always successfully, there has been a tendency in light of judicial
determinations to seek accommodations which are clearly political. Thus, while the Supreme Court of Canada
ruled in favour of the federal Government’s status as an “international personality” in a case involving
jurisdiction over off-shore oil and gas exploration,  subsequently the federal Government and the affected
provinces worked out a compromise political deal which seems to have accommodated the fundamental
interests of both sides to the dispute.  The same trend appears in the current move towards administrative
solutions to vexing jurisdictional issues. This I referred to earlier as “service-centered federalism”.
35. At the 1996 Annual Meeting of Provincial Premiers in Jasper, Alberta, August 21-23, 1996, a proposal
prepared by the Government of Ontario which would have seen the provinces attempt to pressure the federal
Government into greater decentralization, was shelved for future consideration. Thus, while the Federal
Government appears to be decentralizing especially when matters of money are at issue, the majority of
provinces do not appear willing at this time to support extensive decentralization. Québec’s Premier did
express the view that decentralization was worth considering but his agenda in that respect is far different
than is that of Ontario. Environmental groups may need to keep watching the trend but there does not appear
to be great enthusiasm at this point in time.
Furthermore, some provinces are fragmenting the environmental protection process through privatization and
voluntary standards and this has contributed to a significant lack of interest in national environmental
protection standards.
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